

beginning, interviewed every one of the people who were proposed to him, together with General Quinn and myself, to be sure that he was getting top-notch people, and he did. General Carroll had the full backing of the Secretary of Defense and of the White House in everything he did.

So we started off, actually, with a small group of people which we expended to a planning organization, who, as they went on, determined and specified the functions which the Defense Intelligence Agency would take over, and which the intelligence agencies themselves would keep.

Now, as far as the Navy was concerned, and this applied to the other services with little necessary differences, the Navy kept its tactical intelligence requirements, as did the Army and the Air Force. The Navy kept its own security organization. The Navy also kept its strategic intelligence as it applied to the Navy. Strategic intelligence which was common to all the services, such as mapping, charting, movements of aircraft, and so forth, were little by little taken over by the Defense Intelligence Agency, using the people who had been doing this before. While we were in the process of organizing and making rooms available and people available, the Cuban crisis broke out. This was not anticipated in the planning area, but certainly it took immediate precedence over other things, so that General Carroll personally supervised the collection of intelligence in connection with the Cuban crisis. For example, when he found, or concluded, that the U-2 overflights were better run by the Air Force than by the Central Intelligence Agency, this was done with the highest backing, and, from my point of view, since

I was involved in it, with what might have seemed unreasonable demands as far as taking pictures, getting them back, and getting them analyzed. General Carroll properly insisted on an all out effort.

Q: These are what we eventually saw on television?

Adm. F.: That's right. He required that every agency, including that portion of CIA which dealt with photography, overflights, be immediately responsive to his requirements. Flights were laid on, Navy ships were moved about for intelligence-collection purposes, special courier flights were established, and the photographs processed and analyzed, with such speed that I don't think there was any photograph which was more than twelve hours late - within twelve hours after the picture was taken the information was available. And in this, of course, he had the support of everybody. He himself worked probably longer hours than the rest of us did, and we were working long hours, too. But I hadn't thought it was possible to assemble the convincing information which was assembled in such a short period of time. Generally, photographs are historical. In this case, they were not, so that from the first indication that there were strategic missiles emplaced, which was almost by accident - they were looking for other things then - from that moment, every effort was directed toward the establishment of complete knowledge as to the location, numbers, and types of missiles, and everything which tended to support this dream of Khrushchev's.

This went on, of course, until all the missiles were returned and each missile was identified by photography, as well as eyeball, so that a tally was made that all the missiles that we knew had been

placed there had returned, and the missile sites themselves dismantled. If this had been the only thing that DIA had done during its first year in existence, it would have been a lot.

Q: In that connection, may I ask you a question? Was the new organization disturbed? Did they have knowledge of the sources used by Senator Keating when he exposed some of this on the floor of the Senate?

Adm. F.: Yes. Every possible source was exploited and even the agencies which were not military agencies responded to the levy for any information that came into this area. This was discussed, of course, at the weekly meetings at which the director of CIA did, and I think still does, preside, and each of the intelligence agencies are involved in this, which means not only CIA people, but also FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the services, in addition to DIA. So that every possible source, including a large contingent of Cubans, who were located mostly in the Miami area - that is, the refugee Cubans, but also some that were still in Cuba at the time. There wasn't a single avenue left unexplored; no matter how fantastic the reports were, every attempt was made to check, and in most cases they were checked out. We had all sorts of rumors that they'd hidden a lot of missiles in caves, and this would be verified - or we'd try to verify this by agencies as well as photography. The photography was very, very good. Nothing was left to chance and even the remotest possibility that we'd left something uncovered was followed through to see that we hadn't.

Q: Was the Keating effort helpful to you?

Adm. F.: Not really, When I say it wasn't really helpful, that

material was available elsewhere. It wasn't unique to his operation, if you want to call it that.

Q: Well, it did something in terms of public opinion to help, didn't it?

Adm. F.: Yes, of course, it did. The Defense Intelligence Agency was not involved in the Bay of Pigs thing at all. It had not been established then, actually, so it wasn't involved in that.

Q: But Keating's effort was in connection with the missiles.

Adm. F.: Yes, that's right. I suppose the early stages - and I've forgotten when Keating's information came in, not much before the time when we did find these missiles...

Q: I think it began in August or September.

Adm. F.: My recollection of dates is a bit hazy, but there were rumors about missiles being introduced there - we knew about missiles being introduced - these were the SAM sites, that's what we were checking out on when we ran into this peculiar thing.

Well, the Cuban missile episode was resolved and, of course, reflected great credit on the Defense Intelligence Agency, and rightly so.

Q: Did this make it more palatable, perhaps, to the agencies in the Army and the Navy and the Air Force?

Adm. F.: Yes. We couldn't have had a better episode or occurrence to have reduced the - or cause abatement of this general feeling of suspicion.

Q: Do you want to say something about that feeling?

Adm. F.: Yes. Long before the Defense Intelligence Agency was established, there were a few spokesmen in the Air Force who had sponsored this type of thing, and by the way they went about it the Army and Navy appeared to suspect that the Air Force wanted to capture the intelligence field and that it would be used for the aggrandizement and more power by the Air Force. This went on all the time.

Q: Because it went on in other areas?

Adm. F.: That's right. So that when the DIA was first established, there was a lingering suspicion that this was something which the Air Force had brought about. This really was not so. The CIA was established on the same premise, that we ought to have a controlled intelligence organization, except the CIA was not supposed to get into the military. However, it did also, to a certain extent. It had to. You can't separate them. But after the Cuban crisis had been resolved, the agencies took a look at themselves and realized that, without the Defense Intelligence Agency riding herd on this as a central element, the information which was made available would probably have not been made available in the manner and in the time limits it was. I believe that's right. I don't think it would. Furthermore, the people who would have done their individual work on this could not have ended up with as fine a product as did come out of it.

Q: It required the aegis of a strong central authority?

Adm. F.: Who could bring to bear the experts from wherever they were.